This is the second post about the conflict in Northern Mali. The first post looked at historical background that resulted in the ethnic split in the independent Mali.
Within two
years of the formation of Mali the Turaegs rebelled. The response of the Malian
army was swift, savage and merciless. The rebellion was crushed with brutal
force. There were allegations that the Malian army, ex cathedra, indulged in
torture, imprisonment and extra-judicial killings of the suspected Turaeg
militants.
The Turaegs,
thus, found themselves in minority in a number of Saharan countries such as
Mali and Niger. In all of these countries the Turaegs came to view themselves
as increasingly marginalized and disenfranchised. Their traditional, nomadic
way of life came increasingly under threat and there were violent clashes with
other, neighbouring, ethnic groups. Frequents spells of drought and increasing
desertification of the land added to their woes. The Turaeg’s disillusionment
and anger with the national governments of the countries, which were perceived
as uncaring and unhelpful, increased. (One country which offered the
disenchanted Turaegs succour was Libya, where the late (and unlamented) Muammar
Gaddafi opened refugee camps for Turaegs fleeing appalling living conditions.)
In both
Mali and Niger, through the 1970s and 1980s, military dictators had seized
power in coups, and, as the countries reeled under the onslaught of natural
disasters and famines, and faced financial meltdown, responded—as dictators do—
with increasingly repressive measures.
Unsurprisingly
the Turaegs, who had never really assimilated with the other ethnic groups and hadn’t bought into the idea of living in
Mali and Niger under the rule of ethnic groups which were once their slaves,
decided that the answer to all their problems was an independent Turaeg
country.
In the late
1980s the Turaeg refugees from Mali, who were given sanctuary in Libya, formed
Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN). FPLN started armed attacks in
Niger. This led to severe retaliation from Niger army. It is alleged that Niger
army was involved in large scale torture and massacre of Turaeg civilians. Predictably,
this led to formation of more armed Turaeg militant groups.
In Northern
Mali, the Turaeg rebellion began in 1991, with Turaeg rebels attacking
government buildings in Gao, the biggest town in Azawad. The rebellion ended
when a new region, named Kidal, which was allowed limited self-governance, was
created in the Northern part of Mali. Kidal was a much smaller territory than
the Azawad, which the Turaegs wanted as an independent country and was situated
within it. Turaegs dominate this region. The formation of independent Kidal did
little to improve the living conditions of its inhabitants; the region remained
mired in poverty.
If the hope
was that the Turaegs would integrate more within Mali, it was dashed when in
1994 another Turaeg rebellion began, this time rumoured to have been funded by
Gaddafi’s Libya; Gaddafi was also alleged to have supplied the Turaegs with
weapons, many of which went missing and are not found to this day. The Malian
army’s response to 1994 rebellion was as vicious as its response to earlier
Turaeg rebellions. A peace deal was signed in 1995.
Many of the
military leaders of the 1990s’ Turaeg rebellion went into exile in Libya,
enlisted in the Libyan army and fought in the desert warfare. Some of them
would return later to Mali and stir up subsequent Turaeg rebellions.
The fragile
peace lasted for a decade, during which the Turaegs, mostly in Mali, but also
in Niger, remained unhappy and restive.
In 2007
simultaneous attacks began in the Northernmost part of Mali and Niger. The
Turaegs in Niger formed Niger Movement of Justice (MNJ) (although some other
ethnic groups are also involved). The reasons behind the Niger rebellion were
mostly socio-economic. The Turaegs
demanded greater share of the wealth coming from what they considered to be
their own region. The area where the fighting began is also home to world’s
largest uranium deposit and accounts for most of Niger’s foreign exchange (and
it is worth noting that most of the mines are operated by the French, the
former colonial masters). It is worth noting that ethnicity also featured in
the conflict. Akoli Akoli (what a name!), the then secretary at the time for
the Niger faction of MNLA, demanded that the Niger army in its Northern part
should be formed by the Turaegs and not by other ethnic groups.
The
fighting, which began in Niger, shifted to Northern Mali when the Niger Turaegs
began entering Mali, which provoked a swift and vicious response from Malian
army. Mali reeling under flash floods in the South of the country and hike in
international food prices turned to Algeria to broker peace, which was duly
brokered.
In Niger,
the government adopted a less conciliatory stance towards the MNJ. It was
declared a criminal organization and the government ruled out the possibility
of any peace talk with it. The situation in the Northern part of Niger remained
critical, leading to claims from the international (i.e. Western) humanitarian
organizations that thousands of people were displaced in the conflict. The
conflict then threatened to spread to the south of Niger when the government
claimed that MNJ had begun land-mine attacks targeting Niger civilians. Western
media complained that they were not allowed unfettered access to the war-zone
which meant they could not report the African drama for the consumption of
those back home (Guardian readers salivating at the opportunity of
hand-wringing). Niger government accused some of the Western media (in
particular French) to have had a bias favouring the militants. Two French
journalists were arrested on charges of aiding the MNJ militants, but were
eventually released when the president of Gabon intervened. Algeria, itching to
rival Libya in its influence in the Saharan region offered security guarantee
to Niger.
The bloody
civil war of attrition between the Niger army and Turaeg dominated MNJ
continued and resulted in stalemate.
The
Algerian-brokered peace in Mali ended when some of the faction leaders of the MNLA
which had not signed the peace agreement returned from their exile in Libya and
started an armed conflict beginning with a series of attacks on the Malian
civilians. It didn’t last for long and was crushed swiftly by the Malian army
pushing the militant leaders once again into exile, this time into Algeria. Again peace was brokered.
After the
second peace deal in Mali the Niger peace talk progressed rapidly. The trigger
was the kidnapping of two Canadian diplomats and four European tourists, who were kept
hostage somewhere in Northern Mali. (One of them, a Briton named Edward Dyer
was murdered by the kidnappers). The circumstances surrounding the kidnapping of the Canadian diplomats and
European tourists are shrouded in mystery. Initially Niger government blamed
the militants while the militants blamed Niger government for the kidnapping.
It is now widely believed that the Islamist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb
(AQIM) was responsible for the kidnapping and murder. Quite how AQIM got round
to kidnapping the Canadians and Europeans is not known. The Turaeg militants
are believed to have been heavily involved in drug trafficking and smuggling.
One theory is that the men were kidnapped by the Turaeg smugglers and were
later sold to AQIM. The kidnapping of the Westerners brought intense pressure
from the Western countries on the militants. Around the same time the MNJ, the
scourge of the Niger government, split up dramatically and unexpectedly. The
main splinter group of MNJ, which had announced that it was ready for peace
talks with the Niger government, indicated that they would accept Libyan
mediation. Muammar Gaddafi now swung into action. He called upon all Niger rebels
to lay down their weapons, which they did. Gaddafi then organized tripartite
peace talks between the rebels of Niger government in Tripoli.
In the five
decades since the end of the French colonial rule and creation of new Saharan
countries, parts of the region have been perpetually involved in strife, which,
like inn some other part of the world, had deep rooted historical as well as
socio-economic underlying reasons. The Turaegs, spread across Northern Mali and
Niger, had launched several rebellions to gain independence from Mali and
Niger. Each one had ended in a defeat for the rebels and had probably worsened
the misery of people in the region.
Would the
Turaegs accept to live as minorities in Mali and give up their struggle for
self-determination after the 2009 rebellion ended in a crushing defeat? No. In
2011, less than two years after the 2009 rebellion another Turaeg-led
insurgency would begin; it would be hijacked by the Islamist militants; the
surrounding African nations would waste months dithering; and would fall down
to the former colonial power to step in and launch an offensive against the
militants.